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1. INTRODUCTION
Britain’s anti-discrimination legislation outlaws the victimising of persons who use  that  legislation.  The  legislation,
by way of a number of statutes, covers discrimination regarding race,  sex,  disability,  sexual  orientation,  religion  or
belief, age, and (for Northern Ireland) political opinion. Victimisation provides a separate course of action for  anyone
treated less favourably by reason that they brought a discrimination claim, or did something else  by  reference  to  the
legislation.
The appeal St Helens v Derbyshire turned on  whether  placing  public  pressure  on  equal  pay  claimants  to
compromise their claim amounted to victimisation. The House of Lords took this opportunity to attempt to clarify  the
meaning of the ‘honest and reasonable’ defence afforded to   employers  by  the  House  in  Chief  Constable  of  West
Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001] ICR 1065 (see (2002) 31 ILJ 161). 
2. THE LEGISLATION
Victimisation is defined in section 4, Sex Discrimination 1975:
(1) A person (“the discriminator”) discriminates  against  another  person  (“the  person  victimised”)  in  any
circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act if  he  treats  the  person  victimised  less
favourably than in those circumstances he treats or would treat other persons, and does so by reason  that  the
person victimised has—
(a) brought proceedings against the discriminator or any other person under this  Act  or  the  Equal  Pay  Act
1970 ... or
(b) given evidence or information in connection with proceedings brought by any person ... under this Act  or
the Equal Pay Act 1970 ... or
(c) otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act or the Equal Pay Act 1970 ..., or
(d) alleged that the discriminator  or  any  other  person  has  committed  an  act  which  (whether  or  not  the
allegation so states) would amount to a contravention of this Act or give rise to a claim under the  Equal  Pay
Act 1970 ...
Paragraphs (a) to (d) are known generally as ‘protected acts’. Like other discrimination or harassment, victimisation is
outlawed only  for  certain  activities,  in  this  case  employment.  Section  6,  SDA  1975  outlaws  discrimination  by
employers in recruitment, access to opportunities or any other benefits, dismissal, or by causing  any  other  detriment.
(Similar definitions are provided in  the  parallel  legislation:  Race  Relations  Act  1975,  ss  2  (victimisation)  and  4
(employment); Disability Discrimination Act 1995, ss 55 and 4; Religion or Belief Regulations  2003,  regs  4  and  6;
Sexual Orientation Regulations 2003, regs 4  and  6,  Age  Regulations  2006,  regs  4  and  6;  Fair  Employment  and
Treatment Order 1998 (NI) SI 1998/3162, arts 3 and 19.)
So the elements appear to be: (1) the victim does  a  protected  act;  (2)  the  employer  treats  the  victim  less
favourably in recruitment, or access to benefits etc, or by dismissal, or any other detriment;  (3)  it  did  so  ‘by  reason
that’ the victim did the protected act.
3. FACTS AND DECISION
In Derbyshire, 510 catering staff brought an equal pay claim. Most compromised, but 39 persisted. The employer then
wrote directly to all 510 members of staff (bypassing their trade union and the claimants’ solicitor) stating that  should
the claim succeed, the resulting cost was likely to cause redundancies. The employment tribunal found  that  the  letter
was ‘effectively a threat’, ‘intimidating,’  and ‘directed against people who were in no position to debate the  accuracy
of the ... pessimistic prognostications’. Reasonable reactions could include ‘surrender induced by fear,  fear  of  public
odium or the reproaches of colleagues.’ (§4(d) of the ET Reasons, cited at §38.)
Consequently,  the  39  claimants  brought  a  separate   claim   of   victimisation.   They   succeeded   in   the
employment  tribunal.   The  EAT  agreed.  But  the  Court  of  Appeal  reversed.  The  House  of  Lords  restored   the
employment tribunal’s decision. (In the event, the 39 persisted and won six times the compromise offer. The  price  of
a school meal increased by a third, and job losses were approximately 10%, with no redundancies.  See  [2004]  IRLR
851, at §16 EAT. )
4. LEGAL BACKGROUND
At first sight, this attempt to bully litigants into abandoning  their  equal  pay  claim  appears  to  be  a  rather  obvious
example  of  victimisation.  That  the  case  progressed  to  House  of  Lords  can  be  explained  by  its  complex  legal
backdrop.  In  Chief  Constable  of  West  Yorkshire  Police  v  Khan  ([2001]  ICR   1065),   Sergeant   Khan   brought
proceedings for racial discrimination against his employer. Whilst his claim was pending, he applied for job  with  the
Norfolk Police. His employer, the Chief Constable,  acting  on  legal  advice,  refused  to  provide  a  job  reference  to
‘protect his position in the discrimination claim’. It seems that the Chief Constable was minded to provide  a  negative
reference and his lawyers feared that this could be used against him in  the  discrimination  trial.  Consequently,  Khan
brought a separate claim of victimisation. The House of Lords unanimously rejected this claim, holding that the Chief
Constable had not acted ‘by reason that’ Khan had brought proceedings,  because  the  employer  had  acted  ‘honestly
and reasonably’ in accordance with ‘perfectly understandable advice.’ (See §§31, 44, 59, and 80.)  In  coming  to  this
conclusion the House relied on the distinction, made in Cornelius v University College of Swansea [1987] IRLR  141,
at 145-146, CA, between a reaction to the bringing of proceedings (unlawful) and their existence (lawful).  Of  course,
the employer in Derbyshire relied on this analysis.
However, the employment tribunal distinguished Khan, noting that  the  employer  wanted  the  applicants  to
abandon their claims. It was reacting, ‘if not to the commencement of proceedings, certainly to  their  continuance  ...’
(§4(e), cited at §55.)
The Court of Appeal, by a majority, reversed ([2006] ICR 90).  Lloyd  and  Parker,  LJJ,  applied  Khan,  and
after noting the distinction between the bringing  and  the  existence  of  the  proceedings,  held  that  the  ‘honest  and
reasonable’  test  applied  equally  to  attempts  to  compromise  proceedings.  Thus  the  tribunal’s  distinguishing   of
Khan was an error of law (at §§49, 55, and 75).
A unanimous House of Lords restored the decision of the employment tribunal, holding that the tribunal  was
entitled to come to its decision. Lord Bingham held that the tribunal was entitled to  distinguish  Khan  because:  ‘The
contrast with the present case is striking and obvious, for the object of sending the letters was to  put  pressure  on  the
appellants to  drop  their  claims.’  (At  §9.)  Lord  Hope  interpreted  the  tribunal’s  reasoning  as  a  finding  that  the
employer’s conduct ‘while no doubt honest, could not be said to have been reasonable.’ In  other  words,  the  tribunal
had applied Khan properly and was entitled to its finding of fact (at §§17 and 28). Baroness Hale held that the  correct
test was whether the  employer’s  conduct  caused  the  claimant  a  ‘detriment’.  As  the  tribunal  had  addressed  that
question (see §4(d), above), its decision could not be disturbed (at §§36 and 39). Lord Neuberger  came  to  much  the
same conclusion (at §§68 and 75), but added, in line with  Lord  Hope’s  reasoning,  that  the  tribunal  had  found  the
employer’s conduct  did  not  satisfy  the  ‘honest  and  reasonable’  test  (at  §74).  Lord  Carswell  agreed  with  Lord
Neuberger.
5. THE REASONING OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS
Although the House was unanimous in the decision, the reasoning varied. Four law  lords  gave  speeches,  with  Lord
Bingham agreeing with them all (at §9), Baroness Hale (§42) and Lord Carswell (§43) agreeing with Lord Neuberger,
Lord Hope agreeing with Lord Neuberger on the Court of Appeal’s decision (§16), but not on  the  meaning  of  Khan
(or Cornelius). However, Lord Neuberger agreed with Lord Hope’s entire opinion (§71). From this it can be  deduced
that Lord Neuberger’s is the leading judgment.
A. The ‘Honest and Reasonable’ Defence and ‘Any Other Detriment’
In Khan Lord Nicholls said:
Employers, acting honestly and reasonably,  ought  to  be  able  to  take  steps  to  preserve  their  position  in
pending discrimination proceedings without  laying  themselves  open  to  a  charge  of  victimisation.  ...  An
employer who conducts himself in this way is not doing  so  because  of  the  fact  that  the  complainant  has
brought discrimination proceedings. He is doing so  because,  currently  and  temporarily,  he  needs  to  take
steps to preserve his position in the outstanding proceedings. (§31.)
Lord Neuberger stated that whilst this conclusion was correct, its judicial analysis and subsequent interpretation  were
‘not entirely satisfactory’. (§65.) He gave three reasons. First, no such defence is provided by the legislation.  Second,
it placed a ‘somewhat uncomfortable and unclear meaning on the words “by reason that”’. (§65.)  Third,  it  suggested
that the matter should be judged from the point  of  view  of  the  employer,  when  it  should  be  ‘primarily  from  the
perspective of the alleged victim’. (§66.)
From this, Lord Neuberger reasoned, when considering the employer’s defence or reaction to proceedings, ‘a
more satisfactory conclusion’ was to focus on the element ‘detriment’ rather than ‘by reason that’. (§68.)  This  test  is
objective: ‘a detriment exists if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that the [treatment]  was  in  all  the
circumstances to his detriment’ (citing Brightman, LJ, Ministry of Defence v  Jeremiah  [1980]  ICR  13  at  31).  Lord
Neuberger speculated:
If ... the employer’s solicitor were to write to the employee’s solicitor setting out, in  appropriately  measured
and accurate terms, the financial or employment consequences of the claim  succeeding,  or  the  risks  to  the
employee if the claim fails, or terms of settlement which are unattractive to the employee, I do  not  see  how
any distress thereby induced in the employee could be said to constitute  ‘detriment’  ...  The  bringing  of  an
equal pay claim, however strong the claim may be, carries with it, like any other litigation inevitable  distress
and worry. Distress and worry which may be induced by the employer’s  honest  and  reasonable  conduct  in
the course of his defence or in the conduct of any settlement negotiations, cannot (save, possibly, in the most
unusual circumstances) constitute ‘detriment’ for the purposes of sections 4 and 6 of the 1975 Act. (§68)
Thus, the employer’s  attempts  to  settle  became  unlawful  by  ‘going  public’.  Otherwise  it  seems  normal  private
responses in discrimination litigation will not amount to victimisation.
Lord Neuberger’s third reason for this change of approach was EU law, which applied in this case,  but  not  in  Khan,
which pre-dated the Race Directive (2000/43). In the victimisation case, Coote v  Granada  ((C-185/97)  [1998]  ALL
ER (EC) 865, at §24) the ECJ focused on the deterrent effect of the employer’s act  on  workers.  In  other  words,  the
consideration was from the perspective of the worker, rather the employer.
Lord Hope took a similar line (§§24-27), but Baroness Hale alone was more trenchant, succinctly stating:  ‘It
would be better if the [‘honest and  reasonable’]  “defence”  were  laid  to  rest  and  the  language  of  the  legislation,
construed in the light of the requirements  of  the  Directives,  applied.’  Baroness  Hale  reduced  her  analysis  to  the
statutory elements (§36).
Lord Neuberger attempted the seemingly impossible task of finding a just result without reversing Khan. The
trick was switching the ‘honest and reasonable’ defence to the element of ‘any  other  detriment’.  His  logic  was  that
honest and reasonable conduct by the employer equates to causing the worker no detriment. That rings true around the
facts of Derbyshire, and especially where the employer acted unreasonably, but this will not always be so, as the facts
of Khan, and some variations, demonstrate.
In Khan, if a reference were provided it would have been negative and reduced  Sergeant  Khan’s  chance  of
being selected. So it was arguable he suffered no detriment. But as Lord Hoffman said, the  employment  tribunal  has
jurisdiction to award compensation for injury to feelings, and so the courts have  given  the  term  ‘detriment’  a  wide
meaning. Lord Hoffman adopted the interpretation of ‘detriment’ given by Brightman,  LJ,  in  Jeremiah  (above)  and
held: ‘Mr Khan plainly did take the view, ... that not having his assessment forwarded was to his detriment  and  I  do
not think that, in his state of knowledge at the time, he can be said to have been unreasonable’  ([2001]  ICR  1065,  at
§53). Lord Nicholls reasoned:  ‘I  accept  Sergeant  Khan’s  claim  that  the  refusal  to  provide  a  reference  for  him
constituted a detriment ... even though ... this did  not  cause  him  any  financial  loss.  Provision  of  a  reference  is  a
normal feature of employment.’ (§14.)
Lord Neuberger said that applying his ‘detriment’ test  to  the  facts  of  Khan  would  produce  an  ‘identical’
result (§68). But this overlooks the holding in Khan that the claimant had suffered a detriment (also at  §§  37  &  38).
Not only is Lord  Neuberger’s  opinion  effectively  overruling  Khan  on  this  point,  it  is  ignoring  the  two  reasons
underpinning that decision, that the legislation envisages liability  purely  for  injury  to  feelings,  and  the  dictum  of
Brightman, LJ in Jeremiah.
It also overlooks the fact that the Chief Constable did more than merely abstain from  providing  a  reference.
He wrote to the Norfolk Police explaining why: that Khan had brought industrial tribunal proceedings. That is enough
to dissuade many employers from selecting a candidate, and even if that did not happen in Khan’s case,  a  reasonable
worker would be entitled to fear so. This alone would cause a detriment.  (See  the  US  case  Rutherford  v  American
Bank of Commerce, 565 F 2d 1162, at 1164 (10th Cir 1977).)
               Further, in many cases, withholding a negative reference will cause the claimant a detriment simply  because
he will present an incomplete application, excluding him from any selection process.
Finally, Lord Neuberger’s opinion confines its logic to  the  unusual  situation  where  a  reference  would  be
negative. Where a reference would be positive (or neutral), its withholding is even more likely  to  cause  a  detriment.
Of course, the employer may be withholding the reference for the same (‘honest and  reasonable’)  motive  as  Khan’s
employer: a positive reference could be used against the  employer  in  the  principal  proceedings  (see  the  US  case,
Sparrow v Piedmont 593 F Supp 1107, at 1112 (MDNC 1984)).
In these scenarios, an honest and  reasonable  response  is  likely  to  cause  a  detriment.  They  demonstrate,
contrary to Lord Neuberger’s  opinion,  that  ‘honest  and  reasonable’  conduct  cannot  be  equated  with  causing  no
detriment.
Moreover, there are reasons why an ‘honest and reasonable’ defence should be purged from  any  element  of
victimisation. First and most obvious, the reasons given by Lord Neuberger for ruling out an ‘honest  and  reasonable’
defence for the causative element (it does not appear in the  legislation,  and  the  matter  should  be  viewed  from  the
worker’s perspective) apply as cogently to the element of detriment.
Second, many employer responses could be characterised, not as ‘any other detriment’, but as discrimination
in relation to ‘access to benefits’ under say, SDA 1975, s 6(2)(a). This would include  the  suspension  of  a  grievance
procedure, transfer rights, or indeed, the withholding of a reference (as Lord Mackay found in Khan, at §38). In  these
cases, the honest and reasonable defence, logically tied as Lord Neuberger would have it, to the element of  detriment,
becomes redundant.
Third, such a defence has been ruled out of the similarly formulated definition  of  direct  discrimination  (for
‘protected  act’  read  the  protected  ground,  such  as  race,  sex,  age  etc).  A   benign   motive   defence   for   direct
discrimination would do catastrophic damage  to  the  aims  of  the  legislation.  It  would  be  a  good  defence  for  an
employer to show that he discriminated not because he  intended  to  do  so  but  (for  example)  because  of  customer
preference, or to save money, or avoid controversy (see R v Birmingham City Council, ex  parte  Equal  Opportunities
Commission [1989] 1 AC 1156, at 1194; R. v Commission for Racial Equality Ex p. Westminster City Council  [1985]
ICR 827, CA). In Nagarajan v LRT [2001] AC 502, HL,  Lord  Steyn  asserted  that  ‘victimisation  was  as  serious  a
mischief as direct discrimination’ and ‘common sense’ suggested the same approach (§79).
Fourth, another, albeit  lesser,  danger  associated  such  a  defence  in  victimisation  is  that  a  tribunal  may
inadvertently broaden the defence by inverting the question and demanding that for liability the  employer  must  have
acted dishonestly and unreasonably (see Chief Constable of  Norfolk  v  Arthurton    (2006)  UKEAT/0436/06/DM,  at
§25. See Employmentappeals.gov.uk.) Here, the employer need only show that  its  response  was  say,  not  dishonest
even though it was unreasonable, (and less likely, vice versa). For instance,  an  employer  may  threaten  to  expose  a
claimant’s extra-marital affair should she persist with her claim; or report the worker’s  suspected  fraudulent  conduct
it to the police only  after  the  worker  instigated  discrimination  proceedings  (see  the  US  case  Berry  v  Stevenson
Chevrolet 74 F 3d 980,  at  989  (10th  Cir  1986)).  Such  responses  may  be  characterised  as  unreasonable,  but  not
necessarily dishonest.
There is no doubt that the House of Lords is driven by a certain sympathy for the employer’s dilemma,  even
though, as it acknowledged, it is the worker’s perspective that counts. After all, a worker may risk a frozen  career  for
bringing proceedings, for several years if it goes to appeal. In the United States the courts  have  avoided  any  ‘benign
motive’ defence for much the same reasoning given above (see EEOC v Board of Governors  957  F  2d  424  (7th  Cir
1996)). The stateside approach to this difficulty is to take  a  more  robust  view  of  what  constitutes  less  favourable
treatment. In Burlington Railway v White 126 S  Ct  2405  (2006),  the  Supreme  Court  stated  that  the  victimisation
provision ‘protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces  an  injury  or  harm.’  And
this meant that ‘a reasonable employee would have  found  the  challenged  action  materially  adverse,  which  in  this
context  means  it  well  might  have  dissuaded  a  reasonable  worker   from   making   or   supporting   a   charge   of
discrimination.’ The Court emphasised that context matters: ‘A schedule change in an employee’s work schedule may
make little difference to many workers, but may matter enormously  to  a  young  mother  with  school  age  children.’
However: ‘An employee’s decision to report  discriminatory  behavior  cannot  immunize  that  employee  from  those
petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees  experience.’  The  Court  noted
that ‘personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy’  and  ‘snubbing’  by  supervisors  and  co-workers’  are  not
actionable. (At 2414-2415.) On the facts, the Court upheld findings that a reassignment from forklift duty to  standard
track labourer tasks, and a 37-day suspension without pay (where the pay was restored at the end  of  the  suspension),
each amounted to less favourable treatment.
B. The Distinction Between the Bringing and the Existence of Proceedings
The decision in Khan relied on this distinction, first aired in Cornelius v University College of Swansea. The speeches
in Derbyshire did not question this distinction, with Lords Bingham (who presided in Cornelius)  and  Hope  citing  it
with approval (see §§9, 21 and 23). In Cornelius, the  claimant  brought  sex  discrimination  proceedings  against  her
employer. Pending the outcome the employer refused her a transfer request  and  access  to  the  grievance  procedure.
Consequently she brought a separate  claim  for  victimisation.  The  Court  of  Appeal  rejected  her  claim  inter  alia
because:
The existence of the  proceedings  plainly  did  influence  [the  employer’s]  decisions.  No  doubt,  like  most
experienced administrators, they recognised the risk of acting in a way which might embarrass  the  handling
or be inconsistent with the outcome of current proceedings. They accordingly wished to defer action until the
proceedings were over. But that had ... nothing to do with the  appellant’s  conduct  in  bringing  proceedings
under the Act. (At 145-146.)
The futility of this distinction is realised by adding a second protected act to  the  claim:  under  SDA  1975,  s  4(1)(c)
(see above), the  claimant  had  ‘otherwise  done  anything  under  or  by  reference  to  this  Act’.  As  well  as  having
brought proceedings, she was ‘otherwise’ maintaining them in existence. The fragility of the distinction was  exposed
when  the  employment  tribunal  in  Derbyshire  made  a  third  distinction:  that  the  employer  reacted   not   to   the
commencement or existence of proceedings, but to their ‘continuance’. (See §4(e), above.)
Further, this fine distinction between the bringing and existing of proceedings shows a  drift  away  from  the
‘straightforward’ approach adopted by the House of Lords in Nagarajan, where Lord Nicholls said (at 71):  ‘...  in  the
application of this legislation legalistic phrases, as well as subtle distinctions, are better avoided so far as possible.’
This distinction was devised with the employer’s perspective in mind. Now that the  perspective  has  shifted
to the worker, the distinction serves no useful purpose and should be disregarded.
6. DETERRING OTHER WORKERS
A  broader  issue  was  left  untouched  in  this  judgment.  For  policy  reasons,  it  is  arguable  that  the  victimisation
provisions should cover the deterrent effect of the employer’s reaction on other workers. (A ‘general deterrent’ policy
has been adopted expressly by some Circuits in the United States:  eg  Hashimoto  v  Dalton  118  F  3d  671  (9th  Cir
1997).) As noted above, the House of Lords in Derbyshire took recourse to EU law, in particular Coote v Granada, to
switch the focus to the perspective of the worker. It is arguable that Granada goes further than that.
The ECJ’s focus in Granada was on the ‘deterrent’  effect  of  the  employer’s  reaction,  suggesting  that  an
employer could be liable for deterring workers generally, even if the  reaction  caused  no  detriment  to  the  claimant.
Take Khan again. Even if it could be said (as the House in Derbyshire asserted) that Sergeant  Khan  himself  suffered
no detriment, the act of withholding the reference still  sent  a  signal  to  other  workers  (most  of  whom  presumably
would receive positive references) making them think twice before complaining of discrimination. That would, in  the
words  of  the  ECJ,  ‘jeopardise  implementation  of  the  aim  pursued  by  the  Directive’.  (§24.)   The   decision   in
Granada supports this interpretation. Mrs Coote sued her employer following her dismissal for being  pregnant.  After
those proceedings were dead, the employer refused to give her a reference and Mrs  Coote  sued  again,  this  time  for
victimisation.   The   question   referred   to   the   ECJ    was    whether    victimisation    provisions    should    protect
former employees. Predictably, the ECJ ruled that they should. However, although the refusal of a reference may have
caused her a detriment, it could not be said to have deterred her,  because  at  the  time  her  pregnancy  discrimination
claim was complete. So the ECJ’s concern must have been for the broader deterrent effect of  the  employer’s  act.  As
the House chose to revisit the facts of Khan, a comment on this issue would have been welcome.
7. CONTEMPT OF COURT
As Bingham, LJ (as he then was) observed in Cornelius, the victimisation provisions had an ‘obvious although partial
analogy to the law of contempt’. (At p 145.) In addition to victimisation, it is arguable that  this  case  was  so  serious
that the employer was in contempt of court by placing public pressure on the claimants to abandon their claim.
The relevant contempt here is conduct interfering with the administration of justice, which  can  be  unlawful
at common law, or under the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which applies strict liability, but only to publications.  The
letters sent by the employer were ‘publications’ for this purpose. 
The  High  Court  or  Court  of  Appeal  is  empowered  to  punish  for  contempt  where  the  contempt  is  in
connection  with  employment  tribunal  proceedings  (Civil  Procedure   Rules   1998   SI   1998/3132,   Sch   1,   rule
52.1(2)(a)(iii); Peach Grey v Sommers [1995] ICR 549, at 557-559; Harris v Lewisham &  Guy’s  NHS  Trust   [2000]
ICR 707, at §§ 17 & 32, CA; or CCA 1981, s 19).
The Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 7, limits the persons who may bring proceedings  to  the  Attorney-
General, or anyone with his consent, or by the court with jurisdiction over the contempt.  At  common  law,  there  are
examples of individuals with sufficient interest instigating contempt proceedings  with  punishment  as  the  goal  (see
Connolly v Dale [1996] QB 120, at 125; Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1, HL; In Re  the  William  Thomas  Shipping
Company [1930] 2 Ch 36.) Precedent suggests that even if the Attorney-General or a court failed  to  act,  someone  in
the position of Ms Derbyshire could instigate common law contempt proceedings against her employer.
A modern and flagrant example of contempt occurred in Attorney-General v Hislop [1991] 1  QB  514.  Here
the satirical  magazine  Private  Eye  published  defamatory  articles  about  Sonia  Sutcliffe  (wife  of  the  ‘Yorkshire
Ripper’) suggesting that she knew her husband was a murderer and  gave  the  police  false  alibis.  Ms  Sutcliffe  sued
Private Eye for libel. Before the trial, Private Eye repeated the allegations  pointing  out  that  Ms  Sutcliffe  would  be
cross-examined on them. The Court of Appeal  held  that  the  articles  were  designed  to  pressurise  Ms  Sutcliffe  to
abandon her claim and as such they amounted to contempt at common law and  under  the  1981  Act.  McCowan,  LJ
stated that there is:
[A]ll the difference in the world between a private  discussion  between  lawyers  aimed  at  bringing  to  Mrs
Sutcliffe’s attention that she might be cross-examined about  certain  matters  and  holding  her  up  to  public
obloquy in terms neither  fair  nor  temperate  but  of  abuse,  which  is  what  I  conclude  without  hesitation
occurred in this case. (At 535.)
And Nicholls, LJ, observed: ‘There is an enormous difference between bringing home to an opponent the  strength  of
one’s own position and the weakness of his, and vilifying him in public.’ (At 530.)
In many ways Derbyshire and Hislop are  alike.  There  was  private  pressure  to  abandon  the  proceedings.
There was public pressure (a fortiori on daily basis, in person from work colleagues). Third, there was public ‘odium’
or  ‘obloquy’.  The  difference  is  that  the  letters  were  not  misrepresentations   (in   the   ordinary   legal   sense   of
misstatements of existing fact),  even  though  the  forebodings  never  materialised.  It  should  be  noted  though,  the
editor’s belief at the time that the allegations were true was considered irrelevant to liability (526-527  &  531).  More
importantly, the emphasis in Hislop was not on the untruthfulness of the articles, but on their effect upon the  claimant
(526), suggesting that untruthfulness is not a necessary  ingredient  for  contempt.  In  Hutchison  v  AEU  (1932)  The
Times 25th August, p 4, the Daily Worker attacked a litigant who was seeking an injunction to prevent his  removal  as
union president, stating that union members ‘will no doubt have no mercy  upon  those  who  seek  to  upset  working-
class decisions in the capitalist courts.’ Goddard, J found the newspaper guilty of contempt for the  pressure  it  placed
on the litigant as well as possible witnesses. The attack contained no misrepresentations.
Finally, for the Contempt of Court Act 1981 only, section 5 contains a ‘defence’ where a publication is in the
public interest and made in good faith. In Hislop,  the  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  as  the  articles  were  intended  to
dissuade Ms Sutcliffe from pursuing her claim, they could not have been made in good faith. The  same  logic  applies
here. The sole reason for the sending out the letters was to pressurise the claimants  into  abandoning  their  equal  pay
claim.
Any conduct coming close to one of the most flagrant and notorious contempts  of  modern  times  must  risk
being in contempt of court. The employer’s  conduct  in  Derbyshire  did  that.  The  employer  should  consider  itself
fortunate that this went unnoticed by the courts and the Attorney-General.
8. CONCLUSION
This was an easy case to decide, but in reconciling the decision with an ‘honest and reasonable’ defence, the House of
Lords perpetuated a bad law and fell short of offering  clarity  and  guidance  on  the  meaning  of  victimisation.  This
obvious and flagrant case of victimisation (conceivably amounting to contempt) took  several  years  and  a  House  of
Lords decision to decide because of the ‘honest and reasonable’ defence postulated  in  Khan,  which  encouraged  the
employer to think it could bully the claimants  with  impunity.  The  House  did  little  to  lay  the  defence  to  rest,  as
Baroness Hale alone advised. Instead, it transferred it to another element, whilst at the same time  articulating  reasons
why it has no place in the law of victimisation. The only useful guidance suggests that normal private  negotiations  to
compromise should be lawful. Any broader guidance, that honest and reasonable  conduct  by  the  employer  will  not
cause a detriment, is off little use, because ‘honest and reasonable’ conduct will not  necessarily  equate  with  causing
no detriment.
The better view is to follow Baroness Hale’s approach, and do no more than apply the plain  words  of  the  legislative
formula, bearing in mind ECJ policy. As the House itself implied, an ‘honest and reasonable’ defence - based  as  it  is
on the employer’s perspective - would not survive a challenge  in  the  ECJ,  and  so  eventually  it  should  perish.  As
domestic employment discrimination legislation  falls  within  EU  jurisdiction,  tribunals  should  feel  free  to  follow
Baroness Hale’s advice and disregard employer’s attempts to introduce this defence into the victimisation provisions.
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